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THE POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY OF THE PRISON CRISIS 
Richard Kinsey 
After this article was written, a second wave of riots and hostage-taking 
occurred in Scottish prisons. This has mot in the author's view materially 
affected his arguments. 
1. The Politics of Prison Secrecy 
We are struck, first, by the loss of publicity which the transfer of the 
administration from local to central government has involved. Since 
1878 the prison has become a "silent world", shrouded so far as the 
public is concerned, in almost complete darkness. This is due, in the 
first place, to the policy, to which every well-ordered administration 
is prone, of "No Admittance except on business". (Sydney and 
Beatrice Webb, 1922, pp.235- 6) 
Prisons may not deter too much crime but they certainly frighten off 
politicians. No Scottish Office Minister likes to say why in Scotland we send· 
twice as many people to prison as they do down south. Are we more evil 
than the English or is the Scottish system unfair? The astute answer is of 
course another question: well what is your answer to the problem of law and 
order? The opposition retreats in embarassed disarray. Better to call it a 
draw and in future to keep quiet. It seems the prisons must either force 
themselves onto the political agenda -literally, as we have seen so often this 
year- or be sacrificed in an expedient conspiracy of silence. 
The politics of prison secrecy is by no means new. As long ago as 1922, 
Sydney and Beatrice Webb identified the system of central government 
control of the prisons introduced in 1878 and the consequent lack of public 
accountability as the two conditions, which allowed outsiders to be 
excluded and insiders to exercise their hidden powers beyond the public 
gaze. "Along with the practice of exclusion of the outsider," they wrote, 
"there goes an official policy of deliberate reticence, in order not to give any 
opportunity for troublesome questions to be raised in Parliament, and so as 
not to afford material for critical articles in the public press"<1>. The 
researches of John Howard and Henry Mayhew in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, they complained, would no longer be tolerated in the 
twentieth century "by the Home Office of today, on the ground that they 
would constitute an unnecessary interference with the official 
administration". 
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Times may have changed since the Webbs complained that inquiries 
into "alleged scandals" were held in secret and reports never published -
although some cynics still share their worry that the "deliberate policy has 
been to ensure that the only source of authoritative information about what 
is going on in our prisons should be the series of annual reports by the 
Commissioners themselves, which naturally only tell the public so much of 
the facts as the Commissioners think to be, in the public interest, 
expedient"<
2>. Access for independent research is still notoriously difficult 
to obtain and when it is obtained conditions are regularly imposed on 
publication. And there still appears some truth in the observation that "no 
person engaged in the administration is allowed to publish any book or 
article on the subject of his work without the permission and imprimatur of 
the Commissioners, which, as a rule, they appear reluctant to give"(3)-
readers may recall newspaper reports of the difficult career of Mr Ken 
Murray's attempts to speak out on his experience as a prison officer in the 
Barlinnie Special Unit (The Scotsman 14.1.87). 
But, even so, the absolute control over public information, policy 
making and resources inside the prisons, which typified the Scottish 
prisons' administration fifty years ago, is now under pressure - albeit 
largely from the inside. Since 1914, when the clandestine and illegal 
National Union of Police and Prison Officers was formed, an increasingly 
effective trade unionism has emerged, so that today the Scottish Prison 
Officers' Association (SPOA) is probably the most influential voice in 
prison affairs - both inside and outside the Scottish Office. Recently 
professional associations and representative organisations - such as the 
Scottish Prison Governors' Committee and the Prison Governors' Branch 
of the Society of Civil and Public Servants- have given increasingly public 
voice to grievances previously aired only in private. Less systematic but still 
effective has been the impact of the medical profession, social workers, 
psychologists and psychiatrists, whose professional allegiances outside the 
prison system have presented at least a limited challenge to the 
administrative priorities and bureaucratic orthodoxy described by the 
Webbs. The closure of the Detention Centre at Glenochil must,ai least in 
part, be put down to the highly critical Chiswich Report (Scottish Office 
1985). 
Such developments arc important but it remains the case that the 
politics of imprisonment in Scotland is still the preserve of a very few. Thus, 
for example- and really for much the same reasons that the Webbs gave-
none of the political parties has a clear and identifiable analysis of why, in 
particular, Scottish prisons should have such an appalling record of riots, 
hostage-taking and disorder. Likewise, not one of the political parties- and 
this is true of the UK at large - has a clear and identifiable view of the 
purposes, effectiveness and future of imprisonment. 
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Fulfilling the Webbs' predictions, "prison reform" has thus become a 
classic example of the single-issue campaign, perceived by all concerned-
by the participants as much as the MPs, journalists and the public - as a 
minority interest, outside mainstream politics. As a result, whenever a 
major incident occurs inside a prison, those who appear in the television 
debates or contribute articles such as this- whether as former prisoners, 
"campaigners", as prison staff or as Scottish Office civil servants - arc 
almost without exception drawn from a very narrow community of activists, 
academics and other "prisons' professionals", who have little if any 
connection with the political system proper and as such arc accountable to 
no one but themselves. 
The word "community" is carefully chosen. Certainly each member of 
this community has a different corner to fight and allotted public role- the 
civil servant must shield the minister from political embarrassment, the civil 
libertarian reformer must represent the underdog, the academic should 
maintain distance and impartiality and so on. However, behind the sharp 
images and divisions that appear on our television screens, the reality is 
more truly represented as a sequence of dependencies and power relations, 
which still protect to great effect our prison secrets. 
For example, state-subsidised voluntary organisations like SACRO 
(The Scottish Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders) are 
financially dependent on the Scottish Home and Health Department for 
funding, as are academic departments for research grants and access tn 
information. Financial dependence of course need not spell political 
subservience but doubts- real or imagined- are always there. For example, 
academics are frequently involved with organisations such as the Scottish 
Council for Civil Liberties and SACRO, which have been critical of the 
Prison Department, which is a section of the Home and Health 
Department, which in turn funds the academics' research or even worse the 
research of their colleagues. 
Add to this the fact that professional advancement in both the prison 
service and the SHHD is increasingly dependent on university 
qualifications- especially at the post-graduate level and frequently taught 
and examined by those same academics - and we have in effect what has 
become, whatever the appearances to the contrary, an extremely tight 
network of individuals with clear personal, institutional, professional and 
financial ties and obligations and in which questions of privilege and 
confidentiality, of conflicts of interest and professional advancement lurk 
awkwardly beneath ideals of the free exchange of knowledge, ideas and 
information. 
Indeed, frequently I find myself trapped within precisely this same 
network of conflicting interests and values, in which obligations of 
confidentiality appear to be the price of acquiring the kinds of background 
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information essential to advancing understanding. This article is a case in 
point. Many of the propositions and empirical claims I make must, it seems 
be stated in general and unattributable terms. Permission to cite completed 
research has not been granted; thus the reader must take on trust what in 
other and better circumstances mught have been backed by chapter and 
verse. 
2. The Cycle of Crisis 
The Scottish Prison Service carries out an onerous and often 
thankless task on behalf of the community and I believe there ought 
to be a proper recognition of their work in such difficult 
circumstances. (Mr Malcolm Rifkind, 6.5.87). 
We have a double crisis in Scottish prisons. One is a crisis of ideals, the 
other is a crisis of control. The one has undoubtedly bred upon the other so 
that, without exaggeration, we now face the prospects of real and 
continuing trouble inside the prisons with apparently little genuine belief in 
the possibility of finding a solution. A culture of pessimism thus reinforces 
the politics of impossibilism. 
There seems every reason to be pessimistic about the future of 
imprisonment. Both academic research and practical experience seem to 
lead to the same conclusion: prison does not work, or at least if it does, at 
enormous cost and with little certainty. It may be that some people will be 
deterred by the threat of imprisonment but we cannot say which ones. It 
may be that some will be rehabilitated but again we cannot say who they 
are. It may be that it is better to lock away and "incapacitate" those who are 
likely in the future to commit violent crimes but we have no way of 
predicting who will commit such offences<4l. 
As research has thrown doubt upon deterrence, rehabilitation and 
incapacitation so it has become fashionable to fall back on the simpler and 
perhaps more appealing idea of "just desserts" and the proposition that 
people should be sent to prison simply as punishment for past offences 
rather than with a view to their future conduct and well-being. But then 
other uncertainties creep in. Why and when is prison "deserved"- rather 
than a fine, corporal punishment or a community service order, for 
example? And if prison is appropriate, what should it be like? Should the 
regime be punitive and hard or is the simple denial of liberty sufficient in 
itself? And finally, does the just desserts idea make sense when it seems 
people are more likely to commit further offences if they are sent to prison 
than if they are not? 
In truth, the evidence on prisons is contradictory and bewildering. 
Advocates of one position or another can always find something in their 
support and if not they can always say that the evidence against them is true 
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only of the present situation and does not necessarily hold good for all time. 
In practice, however, the political impact has been definitive. In the face of 
such uncertainty and confusion, ideals have been abandoned<5l. In place of 
the rehabilitative ethic of prison rule 5 - "the purposes of training and 
treatment of convicted prisoners shall be to establish in them the will to lead 
a good and useful life on discharge and fit them to do so"- we now have an 
established "administrative penology", which prioritises what many 
practitioners and researchers believe always to have been the first but 
covert principle of prison administration, namely the control and 
processing of "bodies" within the prisons and thus the smooth running of 
the bureaucratic system. 
From the point of view of those working within Scottish prisons there 
are two, working definitions of control, depending upon one's position 
within the administrative hierarchy. First, there is the view of the career 
civil servants in the central prisons administration (the Prison 
Department), whose primary role is to fine-tune the administrative 
structure rather than confront or solve the concrete problems of prison life 
and, according to some sources, above all to service the political master, the 
Secretary of State, and to ensure that he is not politically embarrassed. In 
the course of routine events, this would include avoiding undue public 
criticism of the system by those working within it- such as psychiatrists or 
the medical profession - and crucially by prison officers and SPOA. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that the power and influence of the SPOA 
within the prisons system rests upon a tradition within the Scottish Office of 
minimal confrontation and maximum accommodation to the wishes of the 
SPOA precisely in order to avoid the embarrassment of ministers. 
From the point of view of those charged with the day-to-day running of 
a prison, however, control has a very different meaning. Where large 
numbers of prisoners associate, whether in the workshops or the wings, 
they necessarily outnumber staff and the immediate objective of control is, 
therefore, the smooth movement and processing of bodies through the 
institution with the aim of avoiding trouble and confrontation. It is 
generally recognised by prison staff that, for such purposes, the use of 
coercion as anything more than a remedy of the last resort is counter-
productive. Indeed, a considerable body of research outside Scotland has 
shown that routine accommodations and negotiation of the formal rules 
between staff and prisoners- in dress or tobacco rations, for example- are 
common<6l. In Scottish prisons, however, while it is admitted that such 
practices have a place, it has been suggested that discipline is maintained, 
not through coercive sanctions, but through regimentation, organised 
movement, counting and assembly, which is intended to impose a 
psychology of order and deterrence to authority. In reality, therefore, for a 
period dating back decades rather than the last few years, the immediate 
demands of running the system -whether from the perspective of the civil 
servant or prison staff- have taken priority over what is now seen as the 
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"rhetoric of rehabilitation". 
More recently, however, control has broken down in both dimensions. 
There are two obvious and immediate reasons for this. First, in some 
prisons the infra-structure is literally collapsing - sanitation, 
accommodation and amenities in Victorian prison buildings- especially in 
the local prisons such as Saughton and Barlinnie - are now totally 
inadequate to cope with the number of bodies to be processed. (As I write, 
the Scottish Office has just announced a £6 million improvement scheme in 
Barlinnie). Secondly, in Scotland we have a rate of imprisonment about 
twice as high as England and Wales and which according to the most recent 
Council of Europe figures, is now the highest in Europe. However, it 
should be remembered that nearly three quarters of those who are sent to 
prison in Scotland are there either on very short sentences - as fine 
defaulters or for drunkenness offences- or on pre-trial remand. Not only 
does this mean that the local short-stay prisons are severely over-crowded, 
it also results in enormous pressure on the routine of these prisons and the 
work of prison officers, especially in terms of administrative duties involved 
in the constant turn-over of receptions and releases. In short, from the 
point of view of both prisoners and the staff, the fine social balance between 
formal control and informal accommodation and thus the possibility of a 
working consensus - however begrudging - has been all but collapsed, 
along with the buildings themselves. There is literally no room for 
manoeuvre. 
As internal pressures on those working (and held) inside individual 
institutions have intensified as a result of social conditions and penal and 
sentencing policies, over which they have no control, so divisions between 
the central administration and staff "at the sharp end" have crystallised and 
become visible even from the outside. There are many examples. In 
December 1985 the Prison Governors' Committee felt it necessary to write 
to the Scotsman complaining that the closed prisons were "so overcrowded 
that they are straining accommodation and staff resources to the limit" and 
that they were working under conditions that were "really not acceptable in 
modern society". More recently and perhaps more unusual, the Scottish 
Prison Officers' Association thought fit to join with the Scottish Council for 
Civil Liberties in writing to the Prime Minister, urging that a Royal 
Commission on Scottish Prisons be set up. Among their reasons, they 
stated "we are not satisfied that the (Prison) Department, with its present 
policies and obligations, will find a resolution of the crisis that we can accept 
in a civilised society". 
Such divisions and internal criticisms must not be put down 
simplisticaly to a failure of leadership or to the personal politics of those 
working within the Prison Department, however. It is a structural problem 
rooted firmly in the centralised administrative control of prisons, which is 
beyond scrutiny and effective accountability. In the crudest terms, among 
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the "community of prison professionals", it is quite apparent that those who 
work full time in the prisons feel their own status and professional 
judgement is under-rated and frequently ignored by civil servants, whose 
long-term career patterns demand mobility between departments and who 
consequently have little understanding of the immediate problems of 
control and even less knowledge of the theory and practice of crime and 
punishment. 
It is, in other words, a classic instance of bureaucratic goal 
displacement: decisions on the use of resources, the allocation of prisoners, 
staffing levels, conditions of work and "overall policy" are thus seen to be 
taken on criteria of bureaucratic efficiency. When as recently, both violent 
disorder and industrial action by staff have taken place, the response at the 
centre can be little else than crisis management and damage limitation. 
Inevitably, when such decisions are made behind the shield of 
"confidentiality" - and indeed the Official Secrets Act - interests of 
immediate political and administrative expedience take precedence. 
3. The Failure of Ideals 
It is said that Malraux saw as a key problem of our time whether it is 
"possible to pursue an active but pessimist philosophy that is not, in 
fact, a form of fascism". This seems to encapsulate the problem for 
the prison service. The abandonment of the rehabilitative ethic has 
led to a widespread abandonment of hope. The somewhat chilling 
phrase "secure and humane containment" seems to command 
growing support as policy. The rehabilitative ethic, and perhaps still 
more, the liberal-reformism which preceded it, was an ethic of 
coercive caring; but at least there was caring. Will there be real care 
in the era of humane containment? (Professor Tony Bottoms, The 
Coming Penal Crisis, 1980). 
The most significant response on the part of the Scottish Office to the 
steadily intensifying crisis of control in the eighties has been to increase the 
use of the coercive sanction to deal with "difficult and disruptive" 
prisoners. The cages and punishment blocks at Inverness and Peterhead are 
the most obvious examples. As was noted earlier, it is widely believed 
within the system that, simply in terms of "managing bodies", such 
initiatives are counterproductive, as they disrupt the formal and informal 
systems of control by regimentation and negotiation. However, it is also 
very important to recognise that the number of "difficult" prisoners is in 
fact very small. The recent unpublished report of the Scottish Office 
Working Party on Alternative Regimes estimated on the basis of returns 
from prison governors that "there might be a total of around 250 such 
prisoners out of a population of approximately 3,000 convicted adult male 
prisoners". However, the figure of 250 covers not only aggressive and what 
are termed subversive and uncooperative prisoners, it also includes 
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"inmates who challenge customary constraints by excessive use of normal 
channels of complaints"; "inmates who for personal reasons or because of 
the nature of their offence cannot be in normal association", and those 
"who for other reasons are at odds with the prison authorities". 
In view of the breadth of these categories - not to mention the rather 
peculiar criteria employed - it is perhaps worth emphasising that the vast 
majority of prisoners- 92% on these figures- are not difficult or disruptive. 
It is, therefore, singularly disturbing but- in terms of the failure of policy 
and the failure of ideals, to which I have referred no longer surprising that 
the same working party should conclude that for the prison population at 
large "the concept of planned progression through the system was 
undermined by the lack of any coherent and consistent regimes, which 
might encourage prisoners to respond positively and behave well". 
The failure of Scottish Office ministers and the Prison Department to 
confront the issues of penal policy directly has undoubtedly reinforced the 
double crises of control, which the prisons now face. The sense of 
frustration at Scottish Office inactivity, which at the time of the 1986 riots 
led to the deliberate leak to the press of the Working Party's report, is 
further intensified by the confusion of aims and the culture of pessimism, 
which appear to have taken root at all levels in the system. In recent 
months, this pessimism has surfaced in public in a debate over the future of 
rehabilitation, which at one point became so vitriolic that the Director of 
Prisons felt it necessary to threaten a journalist with legal action for 
misrepresenting his views (The Scotsman, 11.12.86}. 
Briefly stated, it is now maintained by many who work within the 
prisons that, as a matter of principle and law, the primary role of prison 
should be punish rather than rehabilitate; that, therefore, the role of prison 
staff lies properly within the criminal justice rather than the welfare system 
and that their function is to provide for the "secure and humane 
containment" of prisoners; that, especially given pressure on resources and 
the nature of imprisonment itself, the immediate and legitimate objective 
of staff must be the maintenance of order and control within the 
institutions. What was previously a tacit but tolerated working practice has 
thus been elevated to a statement of principle and policy. 
At this point, however, opinion appears to split. On the one hand, 
there are the hard-liners who argue that effective containment and control 
demands restriction of association, the extension of formal sanctions and 
the further introduction of secure "segregation" or "control" units within 
the prisons. On the other side are the liberals, who maintain that 
"realistically" the best approach of the Prison Department and government 
would be to ensure that resources presently provided under the guise of 
rehabilitation are deployed simply to prevent deterioration of an individual 
as a result of the experience of imprisonment. Individuals should be 
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provided with opportunities for "self-improvement", their rights should be 
respected and regimes should be liberal and geared to consent rather than 
coercion. Critically, advocates of this position recognise that, if humane 
containment is to work, there must be a sharp reduction in the number of 
people sent to prison. Even so, they tell us, the best we can aim for is that 
people go out of prison no worse than they came into it. 
In comparison to the current orthodoxy of the Prison Department, the 
liberal argument is undoubtedly attractive, principled and progressive. In 
America, in particular, it has a long and respectable philosophical pedigree 
and has been very powerful in countering the more bizarre and brutal 
arguments of the political Right. It is also, in my view, very dangerous. 
The liberal critique of the rehabilitative ideal and of the so-called 
"treatment model" is well established in the literature. The principle of 
rehabilitation is said to be theoretically faulty and ultimately discriminatory 
because it assumes deficiencies either in the individual or in his or her 
upbringing rather than in social inequality, the class structure and so on. 
Secondly, it is said to deny both the rights and rationality of the individual in 
favour of a modern paternalist philanthropy based on a determinist 
conception of human nature and on a false belief in the scientific basis of 
medical, psychiatric and psychological practices. The logical outcome of 
this, it is said, is the indeterminate sentence, under which prisoners should 
be held until they are "cured". In practical terms the danger, indeed the 
demonstrable outcome, is that techniques of behaviour modification or 
drugs therapy, for example, are employed under the guise of rehabilitation 
of the individual when the real aim is to secure the docility of the prison 
population at large- that it is used as an illegitimate means of maintaining 
control. Finally, besides all this and more, there is the wealth of research 
evidence which, alongside recidivism rates upwards of 80%, shows beyond 
doubt that rehabilitation has in fact failed. 
The trouble is that little of substance is offered in its place. For 
example, the so-called "justice model", espoused by most liberal critics of 
rehabilitation, promises the elimination of arbitrary discretion and the 
professional sorcery of the psychiatrist, the psychologist and the social 
workers. "Administrative justice" behind closed doors of the parole board, 
for example, would be abolished in favour of strict determinate sentencing 
in open court on supposedly self-evident principles of "justice" and 
"dessert". The rights and responsibilities of the individual prisoner would 
be respected and protected - after all, the prisoner has a right to be 
punished rather than to be put through the hoops of the treatment model 
like a rat in the psychologist's maze. 
The irony is that, despite their origins in well-meant liberal reform, 
such criticisms and the alternatives such as they are, as Professor Bottoms 
predicted in 1980, are only too "easily capable of appropriation by the 
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Right, who have no difficulty with concepts of dessert and equal 
sentencing, but would insist on long fixed sentences rather than the short 
fixed sentences proposed by justice model adherents"<7l. Today, the reality 
is that when you throw out rehabilitation, you simply abandon people to 
their rights. 
There are answers to the criticisms which are made ofthe rehabilitative 
ideal. First, to argue that rehabilitation is simply incompatible with the 
coercive structure of the penal system and should therefore be the function 
of a separate and distinct welfare system is to misunderstand the nature of 
welfare provision, which itself rests in significant part upon use of sanctions 
- the threat to take a child into care, for example. As such, there is no 
logical reason to argue that rehabilitation and the welfare of the prisoner 
cannot and should not be the primary aim of imprisonment. Rather, it is an 
argument made by those whose frame of reference is dictated by the 
immediate demands of prison management. 
Secondly, the identification of rehabilitation with the medical model of 
treatment and cure is, without doubt, an accurate description of 
rehabilitation as it has been practised in prison - although notable 
exceptions to this would include the Barlinnie Special Unit. But to consign 
the ideal of rehabilitation to the dustbin of penal history would be like 
jettisoning education because of the teaching methods of Mr. Grad grind or 
Jeremy Bentham. 
Thirdly, and most difficult to argue succinctly, it is both politically and 
sociologically too easy to reject rehabilitation in prison as an instance of 
unwarranted paternalism or, alternatively, of the unwanted ministrations 
of "the nanny state". Certainly, we must ask whether and under what 
conditions rehabilitation can best be achieved in prison; we should most 
certainly determine how and for what purposes it should and should not be 
undertaken in prison. But to say that rehabilitation does not and must not 
occur in prison is as daft as saying that socialisation does not and must not in 
schools, in families, in the civil service or, for that matter, in the Prison 
Department. In a broad sense rehabilitation in prison occurs, whether we 
like it or not. It occurs through the process of regimentation; it occurs 
through the informal negotiations and staff tolerance of rule-breaking by 
which the prisoner learns to play the system; most dramatically, it occurs in 
the production of recidivists. If, then, we are going to have prisons, we are 
going to have some form of rehabilitation, whatever thee political, 
philosophical of sociological position of the critic. It remains a political 
question as to what ends rehabilitation serves and whether we choose to 
make those ends explicit. 
4. Somebody Else's Problem 
"An SEP is something we can't see or don't see or our brain doesn't 
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let us see because we think that it is somebody else's problem. That's 
what SEP means. Somebody else's problem. The brain just edits it 
out, it's like a blind spot. If you look at it directly, you won't see it 
unless you know precisely what it is. Your only hope is to catch it by 
surprise, out of the corner of your eye." (Ford Prefect in Douglas 
Adams, Life, the Universe and Everything.) 
Derek McClintock, Professor of Criminology at Edinburgh 
University, has repeatedly and forcibly made the point that "prisons, 
except in a narrow administrative and technical sense, cannot be fruitfully 
considered in isolation from the substantive criminal law, the criminal 
justice process, sentencing principles and practice, and the nature and 
purpose of various non-custodial measures". Furthermore, he adds, as the 
prison service is "part of the State bureaucracy ... penal affairs are therefore 
part of the political process and cannot be divorced from the theory of the 
State". To complicate matters further, he tells us that "the methods and 
practices of the prison service cannot be understood in isolation from the 
theories and explanations made as to criminal or deviant behaviour"<8l. 
He is of course absolutely right. Any serious attempt to unravel the 
problems of Scottish prisons in the eighties would take us through the 
infinitely complicated chain which, depending upon one's view of the 
world, either links together a rational administration of justice or hangs like 
a deadweight about its neck of reform. By way of illustrating the problems it 
is worth considering the following example given by Elliott Currie<9l. 
Suppose, Currie asks us, that state x imprisons a lot of robbers and has 
a low robberty rate, while state y puts proportionately fewer robbers 
behind bars and has a higher rate. Does this mean that the lower risk of 
imprisonment in state y is responsible for its higher robbery rate? Perhaps, 
he admits; but it could also mean that the high robbery rate in state y makes 
it hard to apprehend and convict robbers in the first place, and also makes it 
less feasible to send them, once convicted, to already overcrowded and 
volatile prisons. In which case, the crime rate isn't simply a response to 
criminal justice policies; to an important extent, the crime rate itself 
influences the effectiveness of the penal system. 
Clearly, even in a simple example such as this, the interaction of penal 
policy, sentencing, policing and crime rates is far more intricate than 
appears on first sight. Yet, in a matter of hours after the riots last winter we 
had had all the answers - over-crowding, over-sentencing, insufficient 
resources, the failure of penal policy; inadequate social work funding, 
unemployment, educational deprivation, etc., etc. All of which appears to 
accord both with common-sense and empirical research. The trouble is that 
neither common-sense nor research are particularly helpful when we are 
confronted by a chain of decision-making and responsibility in which, it 
seems the buck is passed back through an ever widening circle. 
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What, for example, can the prison authorities or the Scottish Office do 
when the judiciary continues to incarcerate fine-defaulters (about 50% of 
all prison receptions in Scotland) and to remand those awaiting trial (20%) 
in preference to bail? But what can the judiciary do when crime is rising and 
social work departments are unable to fund alternatives to custody? What 
can the police or social workers do in the face of rising crime and cuts in 
public spending? But what can local or central government do when foreign 
multinationals disinvest and wreck the local economy? Ultimately, it is 
always somebody else's problem. 
There is a reverse side to this. If the police arrest a young man and 
charge him with robbery, they know that it is the procurator fiscal's job to 
ensure that the prosecution is in the public interest. The fiscal knows that it 
is for the judge to determine whether or not a custodial sentence will be 
imposed. But the judge has the recommendation of the social work 
department and the social enquiry report to rely on and, if he then decides 
to imprison the offender, it is for the Prison Department to decide which 
prison to send him to and under what regime he should be held. Even then it 
is for the medical officer at the particular institution to determine whether 
he is fit in mind and body to undertake the rigours of, for example, the 
short, sharp, shock. At each point in the system, therefore, there are safety 
nets, but each net would appear to be tom. The hole in the net again is 
someone else's problem. 
The institutional passing of the buck, which thus typifies the 
administration of criminal justice and the prisons in this country is perhaps 
less obvious than the problems of prison conditions, oversentencing and the 
funding of alternatives - and much more difficult to document. 
Nonetheless, it has further reinforced the crisis of confidence and 
imagination which now pervades both the prisons' bureaucracy and the 
political and intellectual world of prison reform. 
Put very simply, as crime rises prison administrators are caught in yet 
another double bind. One moment they are accused of failing in their task-
neither the deterrent nor the rehabilitative functions of prison are working. 
At the same time, more people are sent to already over-crowded prisons, so 
the less there is the possibility of rehabilitation and the greater the 
likelihood of more trouble. Understandably, those working within the 
system have become increasingly demoralised and defensive. 
The problem is, of course, that where we have an advanced 
bureaucratic division of labour but inadequate accountability, crises -
whether political, social or economic - can always be represented as 
somebody else's problem. This is even more likely when, as in the prison 
system, we are confused and uncertain about what it is that bureaucracy is 
meant to be doing. Is the object of imprisonment to deter and prevent 
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future crime? Is it to punish past offences? Is it to rehabilitate offenders or 
simply to hold them meantime so that, for a while at least, they cannot 
commit any more wrongs? 
These problems are even further compounded when the public sees 
the prisons burning and prison officers held hostage. We naturally want to 
lay the blame at some body's door- but whose? Few people would wish to 
make scapegoats of individual prison administrators, members of staff or 
even government ministers. Quite properly, but too readily where there is 
no effective system of accountability and review, in such circumstances, we 
accept the collective responsibility of officialdom - for unless decision-
makers can be held to account, it seems from the prisoners' point of view 
that we have one law for the prisoner and another for the imprisoner. From 
this real problems flow. 
Take, for example, the recent changes in the system of parole, 
introduced by the Secretary of State for Scotland in December 1984. Under 
his powers, Mr Rifkind announced that prisoners serving five years or more 
for violent crime or drugs offences would only qualify for parole where the 
circumstances were exceptional. Likewise in relation to life prisoners, he 
decided that only in exceptional circumstances would he consider release in 
less than twenty years where the sentence was for the murder of police or 
prison officers, murder by terrorists, sexual or sadistic murders of children 
or murder by firearm in the commission of crime. 
This is an horrific catalogue of offences, for which longer sentences 
may or may not have the desired deterrent effect. What is at issue here, 
however, is the immediate effect this change of policy had on the prisons. 
From the point of view of both those already serving sentences and 
expecting to get parole and from the perspective of staff attempting to keep 
control of increasingly tense situation, suddenly the goal posts had been 
shifted. Thus, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons wrote earlier this year that, 
during investigation of the troubles at Saughton and Peterhead: 
It became apparent to us that very many governors, staff and inmates 
had been shocked by and dismayed by this public announcement in 
December 1984. The prisoners felt unjustly treated in that the effect 
of the announcement was retrospective, that what they believed were 
realistic expectations had been thwarted and what light there had 
been at the end of the tunnel had been extinguished. They also felt 
that it was futile to apply, at least in the earlier stages of sentence, and 
that any faith they had had in the system had been destroyed. Staff on 
the whole felt that this change in policy could have been better 
managed, that prisoners in the system at the time of announcement 
had been dealt an unfair blow and that an attractive incentive, which 
often resulted in cooperation, had been removed in the early stages 
of a prisoner's sentence when the prisoner may be experiencing 
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difficult settling down. (JO) 
What doubtless had seemed to the Secretary of State a sensible 
measure designed to tackle violent crime in society thus appears to have 
had the effect of producing violent crime in the prisons. So much so that the 
Prisons' Inspectorate concluded that "the parole system must be reviewed 
in an attempt to restore confidence in it because, regardless of counter 
arguments, inmates and staff perceive the new policy as repressive and 
iniquitous". (II) 
Despite the extraordinarily strong terms of this recommendation, it 
would seem that no public review of parole is planned and no doubt, at 
some point in the future, television studios will ring once again to the tones 
of "I told you so". But can anyone seriously say that Malcolm Rifkind is 
personally to blame for the particular actions of demoralised staff and 
prisoners in Scottish Prisons? 
The sense of frustration of those within the community of prisons 
professionals is only itensified, however, when we read statements such as 
the following comment in a press release issued by Mr Rifkind in response 
to the Report on Peterhead Prison: 
Prison regimes by their very nature will never be ideal for those who 
have grievously offended against society. It is my view that we have 
had, in recent times, too great a concentration of attention upon the 
criminal element. The lawbreaker does not have the sympathy ofthe 
population at large. Their support lies with the forces of law and 
order, and while the Scottish prison system is passing through a 
particularly trying period our support for them is not in doubt and 
never will be. (Scottish Office, 6.5.87) 
Mr Rifkind is undoubtedly correct to point out that in Scotland we 
have spent too little time investigating criminal victimisation and the 
responses and attitudes of victims towards offences and offenders. For this 
reason it is much to be regretted that the Scottish Office decided not to 
participate in the second British Crime Survey undertaken in England and 
Wales in 1983/4. Thus, the only hard information we have on patterns of 
criminal victimisation in Scotland therefore dates back to the Scottish 
Office survey of 5,000 members of the public, which was completed in 1981. 
This provided some extremely valuable information which, as it would 
seem to confound common-sense, demands careful analysis. For example, 
the Scottish Office researchers commented that "the reputation of Glasgow 
as a city with high rates of violent crime is not substantiated by the initial 
findings from the survey. For most types of assault- serious, common and 
sexual - the rates in Glasgow are equal to or less than the Scottish 
average". (tZ) More important in the present context was, to some no doubt, 
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the quite extraordinary finding that: 
Although for most crimes, victims expressed a preference for 
involving the courts, there were few indications that victims expected 
harsh sentences for their offencers ... Only 13% thought a prison or 
other custodial sentence was the most appropriate for the 
offender. (!3) 
5. What Is To Be Done? 
The mood and temper of the public with regard to the treatment of 
crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of any country. 
A calm dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused; a 
constant heart-searching by all charged with the duty of punishment; 
a desire and eagerness to rehabilitate in the world of industry those 
who have paid their due in the hard coinage of punishment; tireless 
efforts towards the discovery of curative and regenerative processes; 
unfailing faith that there is a treasure in the heart of every man; these 
are the symbols which in the treatment of crime and the criminal, 
mark and measure the stored up strength of a nation and are sign and 
proof of the living virtue in it. (Winston S Churchill). 
It is now nearly seventy years since Churchill gave voice to such 
sentiments. In the meantime such attitudes have, it seems, fallen out of 
favour and the Scottish prisons have become bogged down in an 
administrative and political morass, which in fact has little if anything to do 
with the electorate and which will take the equivalent of a Royal 
Commission to sort out. It is hard to share the present Secretary of State's 
view that such a body will take "too long to report to be of use". Clearly, we 
need the evidence and research that a Royal Commission would be 
empowered to collect, while the inherent advantage of such a strategy lies 
in depoliticising what would otherwise become an overtly party political 
wrangle over the failures or otherwise of government policy. 
A Royal Commission might begin by asking such questions as why it is 
in Scotland the judiciary send so many more people to prison for 
comparatively trivial offences than, for example, in England and Wales. 
But very soon it would find itself on the track of somebody else's problem. 
Ultimately, it would have to confront the basic problem of accountability 
posed so long ago by the Webbs and, more specifically, the relationship 
between and the purposes of the modem institutions of the criminal justice, 
welfare and penal systems. 
For many people, the idea of political accountability in the area of 
welfare, policing or prisons is anathema. The social worker or psychiatrist, 
for example, is immediately concerned with issues of confidentiality, trust 
and professional ethics. The civil libertarian can share with the politician 
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the fear of a political police force and totalitarian visions of prison camps 
and closed "psychiatric" wards. With apologies for going over well-trodden 
ground, therefore, it is as well to restate the essential reasons for 
accountability in the criminal justice system. (t4l 
First, in relation to criminal justice, political accountability- whether 
of the police, the prisons, or even the judiciary- in no sense should be 
equated with political control. Professional autonomy, negotiation and 
judgement in the particular case- as we have seen in relation to prison staff 
but equally for the judge, the social worker or the police officer-is not only 
inevitable but desirable in the interests of substantive justice. However, the 
exercise of discretion must always occur within the prescribed limits of the 
law, which in no circumstances should be subject to retrospective change. 
In that sense, direct political control by administrative fiat - such as Mr 
Rifkind's change in the parole system - is not only undesirable and 
counterproductive; it is totally incompatible with the rule of law and the 
principles of democratic accountability. 
Secondly, political accountability refers to the formulation of future 
policy rather than legal responsibility for past actions. It is, or rather should 
be, for the legislature to determine the legal limits of discretion and for the 
courts to decide whether or not an official has acted within those powers. 
But it is surely for elected representatives in their executive capacity -
whether at local or national level - to provide clear guidelines and policy 
directives on how and to what ends those powers are to be exercised in the 
particular case. For example, it is a question of law whether an individual 
prisoner has been mistreated by a particular prison officer; it is a matter of 
policy whether punishment blocks- such as the cages in Inverness- should 
be built in the first place and how disciplinary regimes should operate. 
Third, and following from this, the purpose of political accountability 
is to hold up to public review and scrutiny the collective responsibility of 
those who make policy rather than to establish individual responsibility for 
the implementation of decisions taken. Especially as in. many instances we 
will not know until after the event what the effect and unintended 
consequences of policy initiatives will be, the review and monitoring of the 
impact of policy is essential. At present, certainly in the penal and criminal 
justice systems, it appears that too often key decisions in one area are taken 
by unelected and unaccountable civil servants in ignorance of relevant 
information and without regard to the possible impact in another. 
What is needed, therefore, is a separate and independent policy 
making body, in which the different policy requirements, priorities and 
interests of the various criminal justice, welfare and penal institutions 
would be represented. Such a body must be flexible in its policy making and 
fully representative of and sensitive to the competing interests both of those 
working within and of those served by the different institutions. For of two 
118 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1988 
things we can be sure. First, interests and priorities change over time, 
sometimes very rapidly. Secondly, in circumstances where resources are 
scarce and objectives essentially contestable, we can expect dissensus 
rather consensus as between and within the different agencies involved, 
and the "consumers" of their services. 
In relation to the prisons, one possible option would be to establish a 
Scottish Sentencing Commission, similar, for example, to those established 
recently in the states of Minnesota, Washington and Pennsylvania. 
Professor Andrew von Hirsch, for example, argues in his recent book Past 
or Future Crimes, that experience in the United States suggests that 
legislatures, judiciary and parole boards had proved singularly ineffective 
at elaborating effective sentencing principles: 
Legislatures when writing specific norms for sentencing have tended 
to become embroiled in law-and-order politics. The judiciary, when 
willing to draft sentencing standards at all, has been wont to rely on 
past sentencing practice and to avoid controversial issues of policy. 
Parole boards have occasionally drafted coherent standards for 
parole release decisions but cannot regulate judge's decisions about 
whether or not to imprison. (Is) 
There would seem more than a passing resemblance to the problems 
we face in Scotland. In von Hirsch's model, the Sentencing Commission is 
composed of a "small number of members, nominated by the jurisdiction's 
chief executive, and backed by a full-time professional staff''. Such a 
commission would prescribe guidelines for sentences, which judges would 
ordinarily be required to observe, from which any departures would be 
subject to appellate review. These guidelines, von Hirsch argues "would be 
prescriptive, not merely reflective of past sentencing practice." But the 
commission's main function "would be to make considered, explicit policy 
decisions about what the basis of sentencing ought to be". 
This is, as we have seen, an enormous task. In the present Scottish 
context, in order to determine what the objectives of sentencing ought to 
be, a Sentencing Commission would necessarily have to review, on a 
continuing basis, the provision and use of resources - in social work, 
prosecution and police as much as in the prisons themselves. Thus, 
alongside guidelines on both custodial and non-custodial sentencing, at the 
very least the Commission would be expected to lay down guidelines as to 
the nature and purpose of different regimes and, for example, the role of 
rehabilitation in prison. 
In principle, the setting up of a Scottish Sentencing Commission along 
such lines would be an enormous step forward - and not one without 
precedent in jurisdictions of similar size, law and culture. There are many 
questions of detail and of principle that would have to be clarified. For 
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example, it is not exactly clear why, according to von Hirsch, a non-elective 
Commission- presumably in Scotland appointed by the Secretary of State-
should be under less "pressure to adopt posturing stances of toughness"< 16l 
than one at least in part appointed by or composed of elected members of, 
for example, local authorities. 
This is of particular importance, of course, when the problem here is so 
much a question of local versus central government control of the prisons. 
Certainly, if prisons like the police were made the financial responsibility of 
local authorities one might expect a greater involvement of local 
representatives in policy formulation and review. This would seem sensible 
when, for example, one considers the nature of many of the 
recommendations of the recent inquiry on Peterhead, which covered such 
matters as the provision of physical education staff and support services, 
the maintenance of prison buildings, catering services, transport 
arrangements for visitors etc., all of which could usefully be undertaken at 
local level through local authority departments. It would also be likely that 
the effectiveness and credibility of the Prisons Inspectorate would be 
enhanced. For, as the Webbs pointed out: 
When the power of and the responsbility for government is in one 
authority, and the inspectors are officers of another authority, a 
greater degree of impartiality, more fearless criticism, and a wider 
freedom of suggestion can be secured than is ever possible in practice 
when all the officers concerned -local administrators, inspectors and 
the office staff of the authority - are members of one and the same 
service, and, to a large extent, parts of a single official hierarchy.(!?) 
To conclude, I have not attempted in this article to cover the many 
particular questions of justice and injustice, of practice and principle which 
inform the current prisons debate. For those who wish to leaven the bread 
and water of official reports and committees of inquiry, I would 
recommend the recent reports of SACRO and SCC0 18l. Rather, I have 
tried to think politically and therefore, I hope, optimistically about the 
problems and to point out the underlying and perhaps less obvious features 
of the crisis we face. 
These are the matters which, I believe, should properly be considered 
by a Royal Commission or, more realistically, its equivalent. I say 
"equivalent" because I am sufficiently pessimistic to believe that we will 
have a Scottish Assembly long before the present government allows a 
Royal Commission on Scottish Prisons. An Assembly, however, need not 
be pessimistic about the future of crime and punishment in Scotland. It is 
one more job that needs desperately to be done- but it is one which can be 
done. 
Richard M J Kinsey, Centre for Criminology and the Social and 
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Philosophical Study of Law, University of Edinburgh. 
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